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THESIS:

The dominating role of the Krupp armament industry

in all levels of German life ir: the twentieth century provided
a leading cause for German entrance into two vmrld wars.

Res-

toration of power of the Krupp industries since the vrn:r' s end
symbolizes the resurrection of Germany

ES

a force

potent in

world affairs. Will this Krup pian reign return Germany to
militarism?

"Militarism is a form of civilization and a state of mind.
It presses for stronger armar_ents and accustoms the ordinary
citizens to the idea that weapons alone can settle a strife of
yeo iiles. n Adherents to this philosophy are found in German miltary po licy and administration of the late lJinteent:1 and eE.rly
twentieth centuries.

The creed of rnilitarisn includes five-

a"t'ticlcs: privilege ls ::i.n a0.v1.nt:1:seti'n.)8l"'ialism); might makes
right(materialism); war is desirable; war is inevitable(fatal1

ism); states are n2.tural enemier. (n2tion2~lisn) •

This creed of

militQrism was accepted by three important leaders of German
civilization: Industry, Gove:;:·nm8nt, and t~1e Arm:' Criiefs of Stdf.
Industry is re presented by the House of Krup p .

In 1587

the first Krupp appeared and became the r~chest citizen of
Essen as an iron merchant.

Since then the House of Krupp has

played a significant role in making or destroying German political leaders. vin 1811 Fred.rich Krupp (1787-1826) opened a _vvarkshop for casting steel and thus helped the Prussians defeat
Napolean.

From 1859-70 Alfred Krupp(l812-87) aided Bismarck

against Austria~ Russia and France.

The saga of the Krupps
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is one of intrigue and lust for poiver. It is a " story of an economic empire which survived depressions, military def re ts and
foreign occupation. It is a tale of materialistic, unscrupulous
but able men, who engaged in selling weapons to all nations
and who helped exacerbate one diplomatic crisis after another.
Part I delves into the manipulations of the Hous:3of Krupp
in starting a .vicious, competitive armament trade to enemy
nations before World War I.

Norbert Muhlen concentrates on

how the Krupps promoted naval armaLents for Germany, then sold
these arms abroad.

Bernhard Menne demonstrates how Krupp am-

bassadors had a "hot line" on all diplomatic develop~nt.s in
arms trade through key government personnel.

-

A second area for

discussion is Imperial Government, or the 1"eans used by Wilhelm II
to secure favorable domestic and foreign contracts for Krupp.
Arthur Rosenburg, as a reporter for the Reichstag Comnission of
1931, saw in the Kaiser's decisions an attempt to enhance his

role of a ruler who is above all power; whose show of might was
right.

Tli.is Treitschke principle, Karl Novrark emphasizes, was

utilized by Wilhelm in Morrocan and
support of Krupp arms trade.

Balkan crises, :in his

In a third sphere the Army Chiefs

of Staff promoted the desirability and inevitability of war.
Gerhard Ritter researched the Schlieffen papers to pro duce an,,
analysis of this general's nationalistic motives for German
Li ilitarism.

Walter Goelitz, a German historian, considered

Walder see' s theories and the younger von Moltke' s paS3i ve role
amidst the rising tide of militarism.

The parts played

by

-
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these three sectors in German militarism caused incrre sed
tensions in European affairs and subsequent reasons for the
First World War.
Part II enumerates the role of the House of Krupp in
correlating the creed of militarism and World War II.

Peter

Batty and Norbert Muhlen describe _th~ imperialistic ends
(article I of the creed) of Krupp rearmament between·the wars.
Walter Goelitz enumerates situations in which the Chiefs of
Staff become involved in the testing procedures for nationalistic motives.

The authors discuss Gustav Krupp von Bohlen

und Halbach(l870-1950) in his support of Hitler for politicoeconomic reasons.

Leslie Simon who expresses the inner rationale

of the people and Krupp's response to Hitler's cries: might
makes right, war is desirable, war is inevitable, states axe
natural enemies.

The destruction of Krupp and Allied help

in rebuilding is shown by Muhlen to be an attempt to Eliminate
the creed of militarism.

Berthold Beitzts reconstruction of

the House in the 1q501s seemed to keynote the end to an era..
In Part III this student of history analyizes the situation pro and con: will Germany under the House of Krupp economic impact resurrect the creed of militarism?
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PE.rt I Making .~he V{orld Open its Eyes
The new Kaiser of 1888, Wilhem II, promoted Germany in
foreign affairs by placing government cor.tracts 1i;i th lm.er lead2

ing armorer and industry, the House of Krupp.
ment loans Fritz Krupp(l854-1902) was
plant area.

With govern-

able to expan~ his

By corporation brigandage and stock excl:ange

pit'racy /ne bought up coal mines in Germany, the French Lorr

raine, Lu,gembourg and iron ore fields in Spain and Sweden. He
r;tt.•'V'.,.,

il-'--

acquired the rivar· Gruson arms factory by secretly buying
shares until 1892.

Not only did he secure favorable ~urces

of raw materials, but Krupp secured patents for the newest
methods of arms production .

Through well placed contacts, he

had advance knowledge of the Bessemer process.
on a steel prod.uction level ,:: qual to England.

This p ut Krupp
He bought the

license for gunpowder from Alfred Nobel and became the first
firm on the continent in the .producLion of anrnunition.

By 1893

Krupp held the patent for nickel steel alloy and established
the first armor plate mill on the continent.
These accomplishments were but a beginning.nrt was not
in the intere s ts of the firm to perfect an armor which would
3

make shells useless". Ther efore the Krupp spent the next 20
years researching new missiles to pierce the armor. And with
each of these development car1-e huge or<iers.

Despite the pro-

tests of Reichstag leaders .Krup.1: complained,

11

We can not live

from Prussia alone; when foreign states place orders, I can
not supply bad stuff to them. 11

As a result the Essen

concern

5

soon became a barometer indic&ting the pressures of the internE,tional arms race. ; "Scruples never troubled the Krupps~'
says Mlthlen, as they sold 24,000 gun~ to Germany before World
4

War I and 26,000 to 50 other nations.

So went the artillery

trade.
In the meantime Bismarck vms dismissed(l891) and Wilhelm II no longer met Nith ministerial objection to his campaign for Germany's future on the seas.

One of his friends,

Fritz Krupp, had been financing the Navy League s ince 1898
to promote the Kaiserts interest in naval armament.

The

League's monthly publication told the educated middle class
about future German supre. acy; and told the working class of
increased employment from the proposed shipyards.

The Navy

League wa s a hit securing a membership of a million. It was

,
As a result of the exten s ive base the

divided into 5000 local branches and included pro minent ~ov- - 1..
\.;,-...

.

ernment ~inisters.

-,,., i. .i

,,·.

'}
... (.~{✓
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Reichstag passed three ~avy Acts(l898,1900,1906).
In 1902 Krupp had secretly acquired the Germania shipyards at Kiel,after buying up shares through undercover
agents ' •

'iNhen the Kaiser vms ready to designate a firm to

build an extensive German f leel,, the House was ready under
its new leaders. Bertha Krupp(l886-1957) and her husband
Gustav von Bohlen und Halba ch Krupp (1870-1950)

took over

when Fritz died in 1902. They built the first German submarine in 1906 and produced nfne up to 1 Sl4.

The firm also

proc"i.uced the decisive weapons of the pre-war raceJ dread-

.

r'
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noughts. They were battleships vii th ten 12" guns and .24
6

quickfire guns to match th,J British.

Furthermore, the Krupc s

became the only private German shipyard to build eveY."-J future class - battleshi ps , cruisers, destroyers, subs. All
this activity in the Navy Era was promoted by Krupp and his
friend Admiral Tirpitz. This led to increas ed in not only
German demands but foreign orders as well.

After gropping

among mountains of papers,Bernhard Menne found that Krupp
offered his armor plate to the ship builders of Britain and
France.

The profits the firm accrued from this new area of

trade are discernible in the figures of Krupp's personal
fortune which amo½ted to 200 million marks after 1900. At the
,.l

same time the Krupp firm became Europe ' s largest industrial
combine v:i th a total pr operty value of 3QOmillion marks and
7
with annual profits of wellover 25 million marks.

,}N)t
Krupp played an important role in trad~ led to leadership in policy making.

According to the 1871 Constitution

final decisions in ali such political matters rested in the
hands of the Emperor. In domestic affairs the Imperial Cabinet
was res~nsible to the Emperor as was the Minister of Foreign
Affairs.

But 7iilhelmI, quips Professor Rosenberg of Berlin)

was far from

Bismarckian statesman who could r• juggle coun8

tries'interests abroad".

Firms v1ith overseas investments

pressurized the Emperor to provide prote ction and favors.
Krupp vri th great amounts of su_ plus capital found backward
parts of the globe easiest to place loans.

Easy prey were
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the Far East, Nor th Africa 2.nd the Balkans ._,,"i tl✓cheir natural
resources, cheap labor, markets, corrupt and inefficent gov-

s

ernments.

If German nationals or Krupp property were en-

dangered, the dignity of the
the rishts of citizens.

.nation dem::tnded defense

of

To ensure this support, Krupp re-

tained imperial f c--.vor by equiping the navy and army which
defended these interests .
Bernhard Menne notes the Imperial Gov<:-;rnment was now
a pledged proponent of Krupp militarism in the Far East,
i

Morocco and -che Balkans. ,, For example, in the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904, Krupp comp~eted tor pedo craft and subs despite
Germany's declaraticn of neutrality.

Britain proteste d. • Did

the Kaiser take ap)ropriate action?

Vli thin t1iventy-four ·hours

after an outcry in the British press against the KrUll»s, the
Kaiser released the ships .

The trusted Admiral Barandon, a

former director of the Krupp f irm,assured Wilhelm they were
undoubt edly pleasure yachts, al tbo ·_Lgh they bore inscr.iptions
10
liAe "tor pedo room".
The Emperor was used effectively to
attain militaristic goals vlhile arousing the mistrust of
England.
Krupp and the Kaiser next created a new arena of crisis.
From 1906 the firm w2s engaged in the rearming of Hussia, a
11
process which was not completrad until August, 1914. Krupp's.
response to Russian r~ubles allowed every g; sold helAhat
nation enclose Germ&nyts Eastern Front.
Morocco is another troub;Le spot synonomous with Krupp.
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Morocco was a valuable duruping ground for obsolete arms as
well as an area with rich deposits of h....ematite ore necessary
for production of ord~
Schneider

ce steel.

From 1904-5 the F1~nch firm

sought a share in th·::: market.

France's Del casse

"offered Germany the port of Casablanca and financial support
for the Bagdad Railway" for this shar e.

Chief of Staff von

Schlieffen opposed the attempt for economic markets. It was
a slear sign France was down and it was time:

France should be provoKed until she had no
course but arms. If the French will not
give way, let them come at us. They will
run straight into our guns.
Wilhelm listened.

With his well- advertised.landing at Tunis

he sacrificed GBrman friendship with France to serve ·the militarism of an ..Lndividual firm.

It was at this point that

France decided to abandon antagonism toward Britain and
conclude ah Entente against Germany.

Later in 1911 another

Moroc can crisis occured in which Krupp forced the French competitors to their knees and secured a Moroccan contrac:,t for
12
145,000 tons of raw steel per year.
/

Next one finds trouble s:)ots in the Balkans. Germany
'·

did not renew the alliance with Russia,because of Krui>p arm-

/.
ament contracts in Turkey.

Fortification of the TurY.ish

frontier with Kruppturrets proved interfering ~o Russia 's
di signs on the Straits .

Krupp in the meantime sold the TU.rks

obsole~arrns at 165,000 marks, although the cost was 14,000
13
a piece .
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In the 1912-3 Balkan wars the firm was again on top.
1
Krupp 's supply of outdated arms left Turkey defeated . "Yet
Krupp's participation in the Powder 'I'rust made large quantities of German explosives available to nations oppose:1 to
Turkey- through Parisian centers."

Thus the second aet of

the Balkan drama saw Krupp aiding Hungary, while his Austrian arms subsidary, Skoda, was supplying Bulgaria 2nd her
opponents J 11 Confusion among various interests in the Balkans
14
was Babelian in character i1 These were the commercial machinations which set the stage for early twentieth century poli tical struggles.
On the eve of war statistics of the Essen firm show 18
plants and 1000 ore mines in spots all over Germany.

They

used mqre elect~icity than the whole of Berlin; the length

I

of railroad lines inside the works would have connected
Frankfurt and Munich; their telegraphlines vmuld have reached
from Strassburg to Konigsberg.

The industry had become an

empire usin?; its power to manipulate domestic and foreign
ventures.

Particularly in this second area Krupp attained

world f&.me. He was dtrector of the Harvey United Steel Com1-,any from 1901-12. The organization included:
German firms: Krupp 47000 shares
Dillingen 3700 shares
Austrian firm J : Skoda
British firms : Armstrong Vickers 2700
John Brown
7400
French firm s : Schneider 9800 shares
American firm::,: Bethlehem Steel
4300

shares
shares
shares

The policy of this War Trust or Arms Ring was to draw royalties

10

from all nations rather than cutthroat competition among each
other. Their aim,as discussed in their publication, Arms and
Explos.1.ves, wasnto preserve universal peace by arming all
nations with destructive weapons so that none would dare go
to war" . It became customary for any improvement in Krupp ornance metal or des ign to be passed around to the other 2.rmament
15
@
with customary royalties.
In a vmrd , the Krupp firm
became the pulse of international affairs.
The third sector of German civilization which allied v..it h
Krupp to prolliote militarism was the Prussian Army .

This staie

within the State was commanded by the Kaiser through the
Chiefs of Staff.

Both V.'alderseee and von Schlieffen "advocated

war as desirable and inevitable, on the basis of Heinrich van
Treitschkets declaration :
T' e moral majestyof war increases the virility
and courage of a .1a tion; it weaves a bond of
love between her men. 16
To them the nature of man makes war inevitable;states

are

natural enemies. Walde:usee as Chief of Staff(l888 .... 91) believed
a Franco-German war

v1as in the making andprepared an offen-

sive against Russian invasioL called npreventi ti ve w;;..r n. :More
important he convinced Wilhelm 11 , contends Vial ter Goerlitz of
17
"the necessity of readying military appartus.
Von Schlieffm
worked as ChiGf of Staff(l89l-1905) creating a plan for encirclement.

Gerhard Ritter com11ents:

The strategy was broad but shallow. He seems
to have regarded the offensive against France
as a geographical matter to be accomplished by
18
a superior, c:,rmed German mili t&.ry machine

11

Then v,rhy aid 0he Chief , of Staff fail to
ament reform?

intiate arm-

The French General Staff had introduced the

75 mm recoiling field gun, ballistically superior to anything
the German_rproduced .

The French had military aviation units

and the armored car .

Berlin hesitated .

mental types of aGr, ed cars equ..1.p,::ied

When three experi-

-,;i th

machine guns ap-

peared at the 1908 Austr o-German maneuvers , "no body ru:L d the
least idea v..-hat to do with them" .

Lt . Col. Burstyn _of the Aus-

trian rail troops offered the War Ministry in 1911 , and armachine gun-carrying vehicle with catepillar treads .

"This

prototype of the tank,writes Goerlitz,wasnnot found worth
19
carrying beyond the experimental stage 11 • The backstairs influence on these decisions was the Krupps.
the patents nor did they see
rights.

They did not own

the value of purchasing

the

Wilhelm II stood by the decison of his foremost

armament manufacturer.

Chief of Staff von Moltke(l905-14)

had little to say in regards to weaponry.

These questions wem

decid.ed by War Minister Falkenhayn, who was stronzly .influew ed
by Krupp as._ociat~s .
'
· The complex
maneuvers used-- by Krupp to achieve his con-

trol of · government and army remains to be shown.

By 1895 gov-

ernment departmBnts and Krupp concerns were interlocking . Government officials were affiliated with the firm in various wqgs :
On the Krupp Companyrs(private limited liability
f ~ Board of Directors were the Minister of Railw&ys, von Thielen and the Kaiser's naval expert,
Admiral Barandon.
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For instance the Admiral used his influence to have the NaV'J
Bureau require would be contractors to ,provide artillery ranges
for testing.

This was beyond the resources of new or smaller

firms and the House retained a virtual monopoly. Menre found
in his research countless other examples:
The Minister of L_abor, Budde, was a former director of a Krupp munitions work . Secretary of
State's brother was employed by Krup~ as was
future Imperial Chancellor, ByJ._ow. So was the
~ of the President of the 0t.Qpance Board, who
~ tted arms contracts.
~

Hundreds of army people W€re simultaneo~

)

y employed in Essen

to oversee tests of ordnance. And the role of Krupp e:ivoys
abroad could fill several pa ges. He placed agents in German
Embassies to secure innumerable tips on foreign arms p~chased
b<J diplomats. Finally, Krupp made personal friendships with

men necessary instruments to his end.

Among his frecµent
20

guest for dinner was noneother than a stockholder, Vvilhelm II.
In 1900 the

relationships B.nd jobbery came out during

the proceedings of the Budget Commission.

For one o-t/the few

times in its career the Essen firm underwent a Parliamentary
investigation. It was discovered that Krupp had profiteered
in armor plate andwrung an annual sum of 3 million marks from
the State .

He was charging the State one miliion m&rks

per battleship although the costs of )roductio1 vvere far les~.
Admiral Tirpit z viewed Krupp's moves as betrayal of their
friendhip and supported the Left in the Reichstag to ~ring
charges against the Krupp firm .

But representative~ were

f

13

pow er less in face of a government dominated by · the Emperor
and his retinu e .

These men not parliament awarded the fat

contracts and likev:ise controlled the purse strings. As the
historian Hallgarten found after years of rese arch in German
State Records, "The entire goverrunent became Krupp agencies. n
After the scandal died down Krup ~ continued his promotion of militarism.

The Defence Associat~on, a pan-German

group p!l:'oposing a huge army an a war of agression, w2.s supported by Krupp through news paper advertisements.

In 1909

the Union of Industrialists, whose President was a Krupp director, ·worked to inspire"patriotic"electors of the Reichstag.

The firm

financed a pseudo-scientific association

under Krupp director Klufpel, which set u p professors of nationalistic ad.our at the universities.

Krupp acquired con-

tolling interest of Wolff, the official telegraph bureau as
a mouthpi ece for Essen.

He s e t up editorial offices of .news-

papers in thousands of towns abroad.

The headquarters for

this operation was the Intelligence Office. They collected
informati.04relating to armaments which appeared in foreign
news. They made use of the agents to secure by bribery and
21
es pionage the latest drawings of ships and arms.
In the course of this discussion on Germ&n militarism the
relations between industry, goverqment and army were evident.
Family friendshi p was used for ordndance contfacts. Steel wa s
then sold to the enPmy irres :;. ective of German nationalistic
considerations. Business transactions and rivalries in arma-

14

ments became a ca.use and ~

ct of one another.

Granted the

Krupps were but one of the Europe:an firms cavor ting amidst
the profits accrued during imperialistic ventures.

Neverthe-

less, the Krupp's percentage of total arms trade demonstrates
their important rol1C; in provoking compe tition.

The difficul if

in striking an equilibrium led to a heightened creed .o f militarism.
The Krupp's through their interlocking directorates
among the navy, army, rail department, cu.Lmunications and
transportation bureaus
German °tate.

influenced the workings of the entire

The various plants "l so hired close to a

100,000 workers.

But the foremost pocket of power, the Kaisa:r

threw the balance to Krupp's favor.

As a result he

a slice of every armar.ent order prior to 1914.

received

Had he man-

ufactured the quality recoiling gun instead of immense. quantities of heavy outdated artille~, Germany's treasury would
J

have been put to good use.
''·

As it was the House of Krup~

gcbbled much of Germany 1 s financial

and natural wealth, in-

volved the Kaiser and Chiefs of Staff in foreign policy crises,
and aroussd international tension.

The creed of mi-litarism

vvhich motivated the arms race led Germany down the road to
ruin of World War I.

I
\

/
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Part I I Never t ·o Rise Again?

,

According to the Versailles Treaty Germany was to have
no defense forces,except an army of 100,000and a token fleet
of 15,000 sailors.

Under Allied supervision workers of Krupp

dismantled and destroyed 9000 machines, 800,000 tools and
22,000 cubic meters of

masonry which had been used toprp~uce

,£,.,,,.,-ci.-.

weapons. Krupp was forced to produce tools of peace as movie

"'

projectors, textiles, cash registers, typewriters, motor
scooters.

Stainless steel r:hich Krupp developed during the
22
war was the only field in which he gained profit.
Even this
would not have been possible without the help of outsiie forcES.
T-he German Govern.u.ent prov _;_ded subsidies as restitution for
damages suffered in the war, for weapon orders never paid for,
for damages suffered during the Rubr- invasion. The Reich felt,

"As Itrupp goes so goes Germany 11 •
Joseph Wirth

~

As a result, Chancellor

Gustav in 1921, telling oft1sums to b~ re-

leased to the firm to preserve German technology and lay new
foundations for Germany I s progress in weapons".
ceived

15 million toward this end.

The firm re-

23

K.....rupp was also compensated by Britain for its wartime
lease of patents on shell fuses to the Vickers arms trust.
Since Britain had used hundreds of these fuses again;:t German troops during the war, Krupp asked for 6 million. Asecret arrangement was readied whereby "Krupp received his pay
for the bullets which killed his countrymen". The United States
helped by granting Krupp credits of

12 million in 1925 to

help combat inflation. Boosted ioy these su:, s the Hou39 made

V

'

I
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it through the 1920Ts when other firms crashed.
For Krupp was investing these sums in i terns n:ore profitable than tools of peace.

Like most other Germans he con~"

7

sidered one-s ided the disarman .ent of tmr:i..r country.

It was

Sriyv"t

not only an injustice but a danger to pea ce. For staiB s are
A

natural enemies, said Krupp , and a defenseless Germany could
easily invite at'ession from neighbors. Therefore/ the way co
make the new Ger . any s ecure was through might- ,arms production which at ths same time would make a profit .
Gustav saw three loo pholes in the Versailles Treaty: it
did not prohibit Germany from blueprinting new weapons or constructing them on a draftboard ; nor could the treaty forestall production of vehicles which could be easily transformed
into t anks;

it

said nothing about ({erman f1rms producing arms

outs ide of the country.

Gustav tells how he violated VersailJes

in an article"Plant Leaders and Armament Workers'~ ·;;hich appeared
in his firm 's house magazine for 1 filarch 1942. As earJy- as 1919
while the victors were squabbling, Gustav set up an information
department in Essen ar:darranged for tech~l ological and military
publications from all over the world to be sent thera

In this

way he kept abrea st of the latest developments. In 1922 the
Reichswehr signed a contract with Krup p to develop future German ar til~ery on the draftbo ards .
Thus to the surprise of many, we began to manfacture :products ·,,h~ch ap~•eared to be f ar distant
from arma:..i.ents. Even the Allied s nooping commissions were auped . Padlocks, milk cans, cash registers,locomotives and automobiles made a nctvilian"impression. 25
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Krupp also took ac1.vantat: e of the third loophole .Armarr:.ent achievements abroad c.re recorded in memor&nda of the
firm's business files. One panphlet, TtThe Artillery Construction
Department of Fried Krupp A.G. and the Development of Arr..y
J\..rtillery from 1918 to 1933n, goes into painstaking detail of (" irvrTu_;,.2.,J
operations in Sweden, Holland and Spain. (1,-.,J
. :;i.<4>1)( "" '

~~e ~
~%
:,·~. ~ {\,\ {V11,V
, , • i .;',
,,.I

•

Before the signature of Germany was on the Versailles
Treaty Krupp had made contracts to deliver guns to Holland

J

.

and South .American @tates.

Thanks to connections with the

Swedish Bofors firm he was able to make delivery.

In 1918

he had bought his way into the Arms Factory by selling them
his patents, blueprints and secret processes.Bofors and the
silent Essen partner manufactured cannons as early as 1920.
They included the 7.5 cm mountain gun which was tested in the
Spanish Civil War by the German government.

By 1925 Krupp

owned 6 millionofl9 million shares and had establi shed a core
of technicians who could r eadily be transferred to Essen.
When the Swedish government saw f~t tb close down the estab26
lishment in 1935, K.rup+ ad what he needed.
While Krupp developed army artillery in Sweden he was
using two border countries for other purposes.

In Switzerland •

his undercover firm tested an anti-aircraft gun. HolJand also

•

was easy prey. Here the most valuable work was completed because of the free flow of goods and personnel, and the com\,..

pliance of Dutch businessmen.

Francet~ied as early as 1926

to ask the Dutch
government to prohibit firms
..__,
volvementwiththe Krupps .

•

financial in-

The projects, as revealed b.fdocuments
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captured at Essen in 1945, show that Krup

-vrns keeping not

only the Allies in the dark, but the Germans as well. Serv.Lce
Publication No.15 Fight of the Navy against Versailles

1919-

1935 shows,that in 1922 a dummy Dutch company, Ingenieurskantoor voor

Schee;)sbouw, was established by Krupp .• He moved

his team of naval designers from Kiel to Rotterdam in order
to "preserve anc. develop·

Ger 1- an U Boa ts".

then tested and sold to Japan,

Models were

•Turkey1 and Finland.

27

Spain and Japan also proved usefuL Gustav bought back
iron ore deposits at Bilbao and Cadiz.

Here he began wor.1,

on the new U boats th2t would be mas;:; produced at Kiel after
1936. Admiral Canaris, who l;_::_ ter achieved considerable fame

was at that time negotiating construction of subs for the
naval service.

Japan was moving closer to a German axis
28

with the secret Krupp treaty for making U boats.
But the crowning victory was Krup:,,s \ dealings with Russia.
In July 1922 after Rapallo, Gerneral von S&--eckt, head of the
German ·National Defence Force and Dr. w~rth, German Chancellor
conducted a second military pact between the Red and German

Axmy.

Although it was given the bogus title," Provisional

Trade Agreement", its r8al intention was to involve German
firms in redeveloping Russian a.nd German arms.

The German

•

government provided unlimited funds to the German generals.
for the task by creating a cover organization called, nsocietµ
for the Encouragement of Co cercial Enterprises!!.

Under this

guise poison gas and a wide range of artillery and am unition

19
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were develo ped.

Meanwhile in Essen itself Krupp continued re s earch and
testing under the noses of Allied ins ~ectors.

In July,~925,

the firm opened a seemingly harmless machine f a ctory in Berlin
under the name Koch and Kienzle.

For two years the firm de-

signedahd developed nevi howitzer s , 8 ty p~s of cannons, a 21 cm
30
mortar and a spr1ll.Ilg gun carriage.
Q/

I o--_:fF or

in 1926

the creation of Pilsudski' s mili tm;-y dict a-

t ,-rship and consequent strength of the Polish Army rmdered
the disquiet caused by the Polish Corridor more acute

Speak-

ing under oath at Nuremberg,Generals von Blomberg and Blaskowitz,explained how officers were dominated by fear of a Polish
invasion.

The West was secured by Locarno but not the East.

Therefore the General Staff had t aken upon itself to enlist
the im1aedia te supiJOrt of industry .

They allotted a section

- the Economic Staff (Wirtschaftsstab), to the Weapons nepartment
The pe rson..viel on the S;aff came fro1, various arms industries
and their job was to 0rganize raw material centers in spots
hidden from the Control Commission. Thus the railway department of h.r upps was secretly engaged in artiTiery prodution ,
31
although they never changed the ir name outwardly.

____

,. -~~.,
By O-....ctober, 1928 the German Army's( Reichswehr)
Weapons

Department asked Krupp to deliver two exp erimentalTI" light
tractors". This was the code name for tanks armed with machine"'-1
guns, according to the prosecution :..t Alfried rs Nuremberg Tr:ia 1 ..
These tanks,

·;;i

th the exce tion of the hydraulic safety swi t<h./

20

were produced two years before the ~hsw,ehr placed their
order. By 1936 Krupp made en original contribution by weldirg
rather than riveting the catepillar treads, an innovation
32

reducing the weight of ths vehicle . Thus,it was said that when
Hitler came to power, Krupp had successfully bypassed Versaille s.
In all these endeavo~~ ~~v,rqs material ends Krupp found
•~p (A ,

the ever present army P\ Wheh Krupp Jproduced cannons in Sweden
officers of the Reichswehr were present at the firing ranges.
German naval officers sat in the Dutch Krupp office and others
gained expenience in Turkey, Finland, and Japan.

Krupp had

retained the ties he made in the era of the First World War.
But what Krupp lacked was support from the Democrats,
pacifists and leftists who. denounced the disarma.ent 'l.riiolations
On the other fence were men like Adolf Hitler who's permanent
sounding package deals seemed appealing . The Interim State
(Zwischenreich) provided anything but a strong government. nrrl.
--·

~=r•

this vms a prerecJ.uisite for the grow·th of Krupp whether there
33

was war or peace.
But Krupp did not immediately throw in his lot with HitJer.

•

the Krupps were German snobs looking at Hitler as a parvenu.
Besides they always had b•:o en proud of their relation

to the

Old Guard Army, who were suspicious of the radicalism and

•

racialism of Hitler.

°

Gustav's

closest ties were · wi fu von

Seeckt.. ) and von Schleicher, Vfho were decidedly aloof from the
National Socialists. As late as the d~y

before President von

Hindenburgappointed Hitler as Chancellor, Krupp advised his
old friend against the move~

In the meantime neither Bruning

21.

nor von Papen brought Germany into a responsible policy.

B"y
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that time Hitler was eliminating possible rivals.
Jn January, 1932, Hitlet was invited to the famous Industrie Club in Dusseldorf by the big Ruhr magnates.

By

No-

vember, 1932, Hjalmar Schact, Pr~sident of the Reichabanc, was
pleading and scheming with these industrialists in behalf of
35

·Hitler.

•

He drafted a letter to be signed by more than 200

German business leaders as an appeal to Hindenberg to appoint
Hitler as his Chancellor .

Gustav never attended the first

meeting nor did he pen the petition .

(A copy of the::etter

was later foum}inj the, safe of the I .H. Stein B,2nk in Cologne
which showed Krupp rs typewritten signature.) IJis aim had been
to preserve the family business from possible Nazi failure.
But in January, 1933, Hitler was ap~-ointed Reich ChanceJJor.
He surrounded himself 'Nith conservz..tives and right wingers. He
then sought World War I fly~ng ace,Goering,to invited 20 industrialists to hear a Hitler_ speech in February.

As Hitler asked

for financial aid for the coming general election, Gustav took
notes. In Gustav's Private

Correspondances 1933-4, the his-

torian finds his impressions . Hitler had called for sociali2~
ation of the big businesses excepting "the great pioneers of
heavy industry, like Krupp". Their goals became complementary.
While Gustav considered politics important only to give him
a strong frame for business, Hitler regarded edonomics important as it gave stability to political affairs.

Where a-s the

Weimar Republic was vacillating, Hitler wasnot in his aims to

•
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-

restore German economic dominance. · Thus the 1\.:rupp who had
been proud of loyalty to the State transferred loyalty to
the new Nazi state.

Although he did not finance the Fuhrer's

rise to power he certainly did nothing to prevent such a
climb nor to help provide an alternative.

He saw no chnger

in using the Nazis to the interests of Big Business.
After thB srleech Gustav pledged the .i."azisf150, oao
wards the campaign fund.

to-

Once Hitler was in firm control

there was "no holding of his ardour for the Nazi cause.rt Wi th 7
out consulting the other .members of the Federation of German
Industries he decreed in April, 1933, Jews would no longer
remain in the Federation • .tie replaced the Jewish executive
director

with two Nazis.

By August he issued the order in-

troducing the Hitler salute in all German fc,ctor . . . es,not Just
his own.

He became

a .. super-Nazi sponsoring public meetings.,

Further he allowed 700 of his several thous,,nd employees to
be sent to concentration camps prior to S~ptember, 1939.
vVha t other role did Krupp take besides financial contributions and political compliance?

Files show that soon

after his initial meeting with Hitler, Gustav openly shifted
to tools of war. Ordeies came in from abroad. Once again as i n
pre World War I days arms were openly sold to Suuth America,
Turkey, Greece and Soviet Russia.

Imperialistic ventures of

militarism were seen in Korea and Japan>where the Krupps established plants using gasoline to produce steel(the revoluQ
tionary Renn Process). Tgen from 1933-5 his profits went up
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-

from

6 to 12 million.

By the eve of the World Wa:r the Kiel

shipyards were launching U baats at the rate of one a month.
They were turning out field howitzers and heavy mortars by the
score.

Mass production was underway for the multi-purpose 88

mm anti-aircraft cum anti-tankgun, which was to cause notoriety in Greece and North .Africa.

From 35.,000 employees in 1932

37

there was a rise to 112,000 by 1938. A1though only 26%

of

these workers were engaged in armar:ents (4C% in. 1914),

the

House of Krupp was fast becoming the nerve center of German
38
bal1istics.
Unlike the first war the German people were imn:ersed in
goals of the Nazi state. They played a significant role in
promoting militarism through their coalition with industry and
government. Altho 0gh Hitler detracted from arms research this
39

was far from the case in regard to production.

By a continual

line of propaganda he convinced his people that each could
engage in developments where science had left off.

The Ger-

man excellence in mechanical things would triumph over the
"victors'restrictionstT.

As a result, the pocket battleship

was produced concentrating tremendous f_ring power ; an ingenious pistol of a caliber within~limits was manufactured;
the outstanding sailplanes were executed. Hitler conlli. need
people of their utility in arousing and intimidating enemy
states.
Krupp at the same time incited the masses to th:is
banner.

They pointed out the nation was not economically

24

self sufficent and had to im!.-'ort food:.ctuffs and raw materials.
,Export of war mater~als was

a German necess~ty in order to

gain credits for the importation of essential supplies. This
·
was ~b-ig ~b usiness
as an American auto industry. F or as many

Ainericrn firms maintain large labs for their own economic
gain the Firmen Institute ovmed by Krup~ had large proving
40

grounds. There would seem to be one concrete difference.
Weapons development involves a cloak

of secrecy to protect

the plans from a potential enemJ •
In return for Krup}'s role in socio-economic realms
the Nazi t s honored him with hundreds of prizes.

.

The Minis-

ter of Economic made hi1 German Fuhrer of Economics, orer seven
firms in a new economic set up, the Firmen Institute.
Minister of

The

Labor gave him the title "pioneer of Labor". the

Minister of Armawents awarded Gustav the
Finally Gustav received
his seventieth birthday.

11

war Cross cf Meri t 11 ..

a Golden Party Badge from Hill.er on
More important Hitler had his youth

groups dutifully recite around campfires the phrase,ntough as
41
leather, q_uick as grey hol!nds, hard as Krupp steel".
But who was the real militarist of ..:he two'r Who controlled
the arms situa.tion-i

by the Warts end Krupp ·herd learned what

Hitler meant by his vow not to abolish private property and
free enterprise.

TTThe master in Villa Hueg:

w2..s dma.n graded

to a part time agent of the State , vvhile Hitler took or er.

The

firmt war mater-al department report of 1942 shows,that Hitler
was the nweapon construction expert, who met vnth department

•
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technicians n.

Re gave criticisms not to Gust2.v, but

to the

firms chief technician in charge of gun design, Erich Muelle~
42

Even the new Krupp, Alfreid(l907-67) was ignored.

This era

showed the Krup_ps in a new position in regards to promoting
mil itarism .

The industrialist had all but disappeared in the

chain of regnitive vower . No longer did he_ manipulate the
ruler or the Army .
It is evident that Krupp Joined Hitler like mzlny other
Germans under force of threats and under the impact of seduc~
tive promises . - Since a -totalitarian state turns its unpolit'

itisch people into accomplices unless they choose to resist,
/

Krupp became an accomplice.

When Germany was defeated so

was Krupp.
So it was that in 1945 whBn the Allies entered Essen
Britain's Ernes i:; Douglas Fowlers , who was put in char~ of the
Ruhr zone, declared, n Not one of these chimneys will ever
smoke againn. It had been decided by the Big Three at Yalta
earlier, thaG the defeated foe was to make amends.

Stalin

called for the extermination of hundreds of thousands
Germans and the distrubution of Krupp firms.

of

Churchill and

Roosevelt agreed to the latter, using British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin's statement:

11 If

a fellow shot at me

three times(l870,1914,1939), I don't see why I should give
him a pistol to make sure the fourth time." Thus the Allies
formulated Law 27, the breakup of all German cartels as en43

forced by the Control Co1mission.

When the Nuremberg T~als began(l946) to take care of
crimes perpetrated by Ger r· ans, Gustav Krupp was among the
names chosen. Because of his age, 74, and senility he could
not stand trial.

These trials ended and the .i-:.merican counseJs

began a new set in an attempt to convict 1.,he son, Alfried,
one of the director s of the firm from 1938 •. Evidence mowed
that Herr Krup p, as chierman of th•. board, 11 not onl.:l accepted
but actively sought to employ concentration camp inmates,
and for that purpos e, built fa ctories near the camps ~f
Markstaedt and Auschwitz. Most damning, General Telford Taylor
U.S. War Crimes Persecutor,established:
Krupp used the services in 1945 of 55,000 di~
placed persons ,18 , 000 prisoners of war, 6,000
inmates of concentrat-'--on camps 2.s part of TTExtermination by WorkPProgram" . ~
Krupp u s ed 520 woman slave laborers right in Essen.
They were between 15 and25 years old, and some
had been students in Rumania , Hungary and Czechoslavakia. 'Their clothing was replaced by a single burlap sack. Torn pieces of blankets were
v,rrap>ed around their legs, and a t times, i nmates
were f required to walk barefoot in the snow •••
After the a.ir raid of December 31, 1944, the
a.,_
g - rls had to live in a damp cellar . They were Miwakened each morming at 4 a . m. Washing facilities
were not available. Onl:" one meal was served each
day ::i..n the camp. Most of the girls were employed
in Rolling Mill II. Their hair was closely crop ped
or shaved in the form of a cross.' 4i
On July 31, 1948, Judge Edwar J Daley of Connecticut h8Dded down
the following judgement:
On the counts of the indictment on v.h _;_c h you
have been convicted Plunder, Deportation, Exploitation and Abuse of Slave Labor, the tribunal sentenc,5s you to imprisonment for twelve
years and orders forfe ~ture of al~ yourprop eriy. 40

.
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The reality of world politics sent Arner~cans to a reexamination of the :Krupp case.

Between 1947...,.8 the Allies saw

the rise of a new threat. France was fighting corrm;unism in
Indo China, Greece,Czechoslavakia and Poland were combatting
this threat to domest~c peace.

Then Russia took over the Krupp

firms in East Berlin and established a blockade against the
West.

It was evident to many- American observors tha, Germany

was not economically strong enough to survive a communist
thrust.

So it was that just after the Chines~Comrnun:i:ts en-

tered the Korean War, Alfried and other Kruppian prisoners
47
heard their sentences were being reviewed.
The incredible then happened~ As with Gustav after
World War I, the pattern of arrest and 'early release was repe&ted in the case of Alfried." On January 30,1951,. U.S. High
Comn,issioner John

Mccloy commuted the sentence to time al-

ready served and restored to Alfried his full properiy rights. "
Three days later he was released and received by his relative:;,
"who swamped him with daffodils and carried him off to a cham48
pagne breakfast~ One reporter asked him whether he would a~
gain produce cannons. And Krupp answered, 11 I hope it will
never again be necessary, but what a factory produces, depends
not only on the will of the ovmer, but on the politics of its
49

government."
This move enraged the British.

They c±ied ttexpediency 11 :

if the Soviet threat hadn't increased Krupp would be paying
for his crimes in jail.

John 1=cCloy viewed the case from

another angle, that of American constitutional law.

Had Krupp
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personally stolen anything or maltreated anyone? Mccloy notei:
Evidence showed that Herr Krupp had committed
his crimes at a board meeting. That did not
make him any less culpable, but his guilt was
that of gross negligence, indifference and
weakness of character, rather than that of intentional evil. These were the reasons why
his 12 ~ear sentence was commuted into the 6
he had already served(since taken into custody in 1945) . In the states a man can be
freed after having done one-third his time.
As for Krupp's property McCloy pointed out that if we wanted
to seize the works as reparations at the end

of the war this

would have been a legi tir:,ate political decision
annexation of territory.

similar

to

What was at stake in restorir:g the

property to KruppTTwas a legal principle :

according to Anglo-

s axon traditions , you cannot punish a man for his crimes by
taking his property awayn.
Nevertheless the McCloy ruling led ·American diplomats
in August, 1952
to offer A an agreement, whereby Krupp was to be compensated
withf25 million for his coal, iron and steel holdings which
the Allies had taken.

This would get the firm back on the

road to stability, thereby contributing "to . the defence of
Europe".
Once again the British and French viewed the move as a
violation of Allied Law 27, chich called for the complete
breakup of German industrial empires and a bar to the return
to ownership of persons who have furthered the agressive

Nazi

party".

-

They prepared a March, 1953 agreement with Krupp :bo
51
ensure themselves the law would be upheld.
By this so-called
Krupp treaty the firm was to be sliced vertically and horizon-
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industrialist Axel ;Nenner

bought control of BochUJner Vere:in •

By a private agreement between Bochumer and Krup p firms the
54
Konst o_ntin was returned to Krupp in 1958. As for the other
mines in the Ruhr complex no offer has met with Krupp demands . One Dutch offer of $2.5 million comes no where near
its value of $300· million.

Thus the 1953 Krupp treaty, as an

unprecedented commercial . treaty between a private individual
and three sovereign powers, pr oved an immediate failure.

11

It

showed the now internationally acceJ ted uniqueness of the
55
.
House of Krupp. 11 It was evident the restrictions of the agreement were as unenforceable as similar attempts against
the Krupps after World War I.
In the meantime Kru~ p had surveyed his property in 1951
and f ound one third of his steel works had

been destroyed by

bombings and much had been dismantled by the conquerin g Russ:ian
armies. He found it would take a half bill ion dollars to retore the company to its lfi43 conditions.

Gener al tax credits

by the German gove1 nr..,ent supplied a good part of the funds.
56
Krupp workers bought shares so as to help. Alfried chose
Berthold Beitz in 1954 a manager.

ttQnly 39, he was one of the

energetic, shirt-sleeved young men, who ca; e to the top of
Ger_ an business after the war•" he was called ttthe Arnerican 11
by the method he
57
formality.

-

got things done without the German rules of

While the Allies wisely ps rmitted the revival of Ruhr
steelmaking, Beitz carried it out. He wrought for hrupp and

,7

vo.,~1.,1.e.,

30

7.

tally to eliminate any possibility of reestablishing mil- II
.1taristic trade. Under the terms of the accord Krupp pledged
to sell his entire coal, steel and iron assets before 1960.
He cound never reinvest in these commoditi~s.

nrn return the

A.l lies lifted all controls on the other branches of his industrial empire, including shipyards , locamotive plants , and
an array of other companiesU

The deal left Krupp, with $140

million, making him once again one of the richest men in
Europe.

52

f\ The British and French were convinc84 his s.J..gnature would~,
legally am:.. morally binding ~ But Krupp had his lav,yer s sign<J,,,1
He felt he was not at all bound by a pledge which had been
extorted under duress - threat of losing his fortune. His

. i;-3

lawyers pointed out.this violated the moral code.

Second, the

promistjnever aga~n to.engage in steelmaking violated theeSi.J.

quality of citizens before the law. 'Further, the Federal
Constitution written by the Allies granted every West Germc,n
the right to enter any occupation.

Therefore the Gennan

government stated it could not withhold Alfried from underts.king business dealings in coal and steel~ Third, the pro"

mise to sell the major steel plant at Rheinhausen and all
coal mines viii thin five years at a reasonable price proved
ambiguous.

Krupp could discourage prospective purchasers on

1~'1

the claim that the price was not right.

Take for example the

Konstantin mine which was bought in 1956 by Bochumer Verein,
a Ruhr steel .firm. Secretly, an old Krupp friend, Swedish
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Germany an Econo.,.ic Miracle or Wirtschaftswunder of the 1950 ts ..
The House obtained immense returns from German an~CSC markets,('?
By 1961 Krupp held 40% of West Germany J s market in power sho-.
/

vels, 36% of the share in electric locomotives, :53% in air58

plane manuf,acfure, 12% in cranes.

His wares included bridges,

diesel engin,2s, ships , honey, stainless steel teeth. Less th-c.Y\
$30 million of the firmts $1.3 billion in sales in 1962 re-

59
sulted from military production of radar, trucks and aircraft.
t'lt,()- !ri;)

In the same decade Beitz had moved Krupp again outside
the Eur.opean mar.kerJ_.
tions.

He aimed at aiding underdeveloped na-

He organized fantastic deals: Brazil gained a major

machine shop industry; Columbia'built fourteen span brigges.;
steel mills p9pped up in India, Pakistan, Brazil; Guinea was
aided in developing a harbor; Syria received he]f)Jn i1anning ,
a dam end Greece in building an oil refinery. In a matter of
years the House of Kru1: p had invested $250 million in 22· under,
60
develop$~Qcountries. It was an investment reaping admiration
\

from worlr:i powers as well as profits.
Beitz' tremendous achievement was permission from the
Russian government to open a Krupy office in Moscmv- no otherf,Vr¥l

so1:tfr!If1 in the West has been able to do so.

With exports at

$200 million in 1962 trade with the Soviet bloc amounted to

$7 million.

The market,says Beitz;could be expanded ten fold,
61

thereby imprmving diplomatic relations.n
Then came the idea f' or an agreement ·,Ji th Po J.and.

nI

t:hirk

we owe it to Poland to help them build their ··country again, n
remarked Beitz. In 198-5 an industrial complex manned

W the
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Poles but " ana ged by the Krup:' s, was e stabl i s hed.
team of 250 trained the workers.

A ~up p

The Polish governmeb.t was

then to chose which of the 3000 i ndustri al pro ducts from the
Kr upp catalogue they wished to produce.

Krupp eq_uir ment and

manageLent coupled with Polish builciing s and staff. The partners r~ould s :r:,ilt profits from sale s of pea ceful products.
T-his idea of

11

co-production" looks like an ingeni( us way for

Krupp to expand business v1ith Communist countries.

Such deals

could be a move toward a new foreign policy for Germany.
· wi.th agreements as suring wages, housing ana quasi-diplomatic
privileges for Krupp managee s in communist countries, there
will have to be a revocation of the Hallstein Doctrine. According to this document West Ger .. any will not recognize any
country(exc ept Russia) tha t has diplomatic relations with
East Germany- Poland, Hungary, Czechoslavakia, Rumania, Bulgat'62
ia, Yugo slavi a . The House of Krupp aims to eliminate the
the militaristic fears tha t all s tates are . natural enemies
by edonomic intercourse.
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Part III ~he Krupp Trauma
Pursuit of trade with the Soviet bloc leads one

to

surmise apossible reactionary movement of the House of Krupp.
In 1869 Alfred Krupp refused to let Wilhe1mI halt his sales
to Napolean III and other enemies of Germany ready to attack
it.

In 1959 Alfried Krupp refused to let German Chancellor

fl

Adenauer halt his sales to Kru~chevand other enemies of democracy and freedom.

Norbert Muhlen contends this unpolitisch

businesss is shortsighted in regard to responsibility to the
63

world community to oppose the communist threat.
Oswald Spengler points out,

11

It is as

Creative humans Yvho build cul-

tures are eventually replaced by manipulators who ,i n the
name of profits push toward concentrations of power'~ which
64

destroy the culture.
vd th

Peter Batty backs up this statement

some facts. "When Krup.f.! was sentenced at Nuremberg in

· July, 1948 he became penniless; almost twenty years later he
was a multi-millionaire, with a spendable income each year of
7 digits~

Krupp had prospered even at Germany's loss. It was as

Leon Blum used to say, "The graatest industrialists of Europe
are the only ones to survive the cataclysms that periodically
65

shake the continent."
The crux of the issuB lies in the means Krupp has used
to regain his position. Has there been a rehabilitating trend
)

through the production of peaceful goods? Statistics show that
'

of the 30 divisions of Krupp, coal and steel are produced in
amounts equal co only 30% of the company's total business.
These products are used at the Krupp shipyards(including Ger:..a
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many's second l a rgest) and to supply the Federal Railway
vii th locomotives.

.jirupp also employed his products in the

Flugtechnische Werke in Bremen, which accounts for on2 third
66

of German aviation production, and is 40% Krupp owned.
Krupp is not rearming Germany at the present time.

Many observors fear for the future. The Krupps have
never relinquished their immense power over the people of
the Ruhr, the German government or their Armed Forces. nrndustialist power is still concentrated in the hand o of a fe~)
says Thor: as Prittie, and thus retains the"arrogance of Germany-Ts
67

past'~

-

This is evident by the skilful operations of Krupp and

others in regard to the Allied Law 27.

Then too consider how

Krupp has avoided compliance v.rith the 15 year old Allied order
to sell coal and steel properties.

As the news magazine, Der

Spiegel asserted in an article about Krupp,February 28, 1968,
f!German industry deemed it a mc.tter of honor not to bid for
Krupp holdings!!.

The Fred Krupp GmbH corporation formed in

JanuE~ry, 1968, from the s pr a.wling Krupp family holdings considered the Allied order of 1953 invalid.

West Germany as a

re. ember of the EEC and ESC must concentrate production into
larger and more efficent units.

The divestment order would

68
be contrary to the decision of the Common Market organization. v
Will the Besurgent Germany then start/to

manufacture

munitions, although Krupp himself has voluntarily pledged not
to? Will West Germany's alliance with the West against Russi a
change the situation?

Is the U.S. powerless to enforce the

1953 order because of t~e-ups in Vietnam? Or do the present

35

trends ~n the Ruhr portend the building of a fervent defender of Europe?
Today Germans still wan~ supremacy of their country as
a European

power.

But the end to the goal no longer seems

to be tbrough "tools of war". Muhlen claims there are several
reasons.

The first is psychological.

Since the arms trade

has so often plunged Germany into the horrors of world war,
the people are not anxious to repeat the experience.

The

second is rational. Germans see their new status as a second
rate power under tbree giants, Russian, China and thf .s.
She must join with her neighbors to provide a bulwark for
EuropeBn power. The youth of Germany ~ave grown up in

this

new era and seem to be awake to their responsibilitie:,as
{o Lf

meLbers of the Wes tern community.
But the Krupps vvill also have their say. Are thw as
strong as in past generation~? In 1967, the firm in t:ime of
peace without tremendous arms markets was near bankruptcy.
Perhaps Beitz was too good a dealer, for he couldn't finance
what he sold.

Manuf&cturing operations were too varied (pre-

fab houses, high~temperature reactors to wines and false
teeth), too numerous(3000 products), or too small to be
profitable.

Exportation to underdeveloped countries had in-

volved Krupp in

cut...--tbroat competition.

Economic Minister

Karl Schihee and Finance Minister Franz Strauss offered the
ailing firm $138 million in government and bank credits.
in return was required to change the firm into a

Kru1:p

.stare com-
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pany by 1968, and had to publish balance !:,h~e t s for coal and
steel manufacture.

Finally, Alfried Ts thirty year old s on,

Arndt, renounced the Krupp name and authority in the com-

7.0
pany in return for a $500,000 a year settlement fro L1 ihe firm.
Yet after all is said the Krupp saga lives as the phoenix
amidst universal fear and distrust .

Many are suspicious that

the firrn, which has played a role in the unhappy history of
our times, will once again invoke the creed of militarism.
/'-

1

The men at the top have changed but how can one be sure their
)

attitudes have _ likewise changed?

The products a re different,

but are the principles?,, This has been and will be the
;.
_____..
..
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1
i, Ji ~ 1 ~\- >-·j; ,?"J, ,, ""'\
criteria f..ar the House of Krup p in prorribti~.g German mili tarisn •
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1Robert Goldsmith, A League to Enforce Peace, p. 190.
see Max Harden the German editor in t ..eNYc Times, N 8 '1916,.
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